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TEACHING WILLS AND TRUSTS: THE JURISDICTIONAL 
PROBLEM 
ADAM J. HIRSCH* 
Anyone preparing to teach Wills and Trusts faces a dilemma when 
choosing a jurisdictional perspective. Most of the rules found in the inheritance 
field are a matter of state law, and most of that law nowadays finds expression 
in local statutes. In the nineteenth century, only a few discrete areas of the 
inheritance field—the rules of intestacy, the rules of formalization, spousal 
rights—were codified.1 The subsequent movement toward “statutorification”2 
swept up inheritance law, along with many other categories of doctrine; today 
every state has its own probate code, invariably supplemented by common-law 
rules, but covering large swaths of terrain previously governed by judge-made 
law.3 Scholars examining the general movement toward statutorification have 
emphasized its tendency to entrench rules.4 Another subtler, and less remarked, 
consequence of the movement has been to encourage pluralism, unleashing 
centrifugal forces once lawmakers in individual states, freed from the moorings 
of precedent and from a common-law jurisprudence that valued 
interjurisdictional conformity, began innovating and fiddling.5 Those forces 
have caused inheritance law in the United States to become increasingly 
diversified. 
This state of affairs leaves Wills and Trusts professors in a quandary. To 
attempt to cover the law of all fifty states would be hopeless. But to teach the 
law of any one state seems hopelessly narrow. This problem doubtless arises 
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 1. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance: United States Law, in 3 OXFORD 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 235, 235–37 (Stanley N. Katz ed. 2009). 
 2. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). 
 3. For a legislative tally of all 50 state probate codes, see Uniform Probate Code (UPC) 
Adoption By The States, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litiga 
tion_committees/trust/50-state-probate-code-survey.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
 4. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 1–7; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN 
LAW 95–96 (1977). 
 5. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 74, 76–77 (hinting at the phenomenon); Giacomo A. M. 
Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez, Case Law Versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 
37 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2008). 
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for professors teaching in other areas, too, but it is particularly acute in the 
inheritance field. 
For professors teaching at “regional” law schools, the pluralistic turn of 
Wills and Trusts could invite a narrowing of perspective. I spent years teaching 
at a law school where a large majority of graduates went on to practice in-state. 
One of my colleagues there made a career-long practice of teaching, and 
testing on, the state’s probate code—transforming the class, in effect, into an 
expanded bar-review course. If nothing else, this approach simplifies the task 
of the professor (and of the students). It also serves the purpose of preparing 
students for the state bar examination, and for local practice thereafter. Indeed, 
by encouraging all of its professors to follow suit, a law school can seek to 
establish a local reputation for high bar-passage rates, doubtless a selling point 
for a program competing with other regional law schools for in-state students. 
For any law school with larger aspirations, though, the downside of this 
approach is obvious. To teach locally encourages students to think locally—to 
play the part that their professors assign to them. And, for those students who 
do get the opportunity to practice in another jurisdiction, the value of a state-
based Wills and Trusts course decreases—possibly a subtle disincentive for 
graduates who wish to practice in the field to seek out opportunities beyond the 
state where they studied. When I arrived at my current law school, I was told 
unequivocally that the administration would prefer that I not emphasize local 
law. Needless to add, the notion of teaching a localized Wills and Trusts course 
within any one of the top, nationally-recognized law schools would be 
outlandish. Upon graduation, its students will scatter among the states, making 
a focus on any one state’s law, including that of the state where the law school 
happens to be located, pointless and arbitrary. 
An alternative approach—equally narrow in one sense, but broader in 
another—is to concentrate on, and to test on, the “model” laws of Wills and 
Trusts.6 The field is fortunate to have at its disposal two up-to-date 
Restatements: the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, and the Restatement (Third) 
of Property, completed in 2005 and 2010, respectively.7 These are paralleled 
by two modern Uniform Acts: the Uniform Trust Code, promulgated in 2000, 
and the Uniform Probate Code, whose revised substantive article dates to 1990, 
with significant amendments in 2008.8 These products are highly integrated. 
The reporter for the revised Uniform Probate Code doubled as reporter for the 
 
 6. One current casebook is geared to this approach. See THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY 
PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS (5th ed. 
2011). 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS 
AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (2010). 
 8. UNIF. TRUST CODE, 7C U.L.A. 362–74 (amended 2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 pts. 1–
3 U.L.A. (amended 2010). 
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Restatement (Third) of Property, and he strove “to try to make [them] . . . 
consistent with one another.”9 Likewise, “[t]he Uniform Trust Code was 
drafted in close coordination with the writing of the Restatement Third [of 
Trusts].”10 
By teaching the model laws, a professor can again emphasize a single, 
coherent body of law, while at the same time eschewing localism. The 
difficulty remains that, in so doing, the Wills and Trusts course becomes, to a 
certain degree, detached from reality. Although the Uniform Probate Code has 
proven influential in some pockets of the field—notably with regard to its 
intestacy provisions—thus far only sixteen, mostly smallish, jurisdictions have 
adopted substantial parts of either the current or an earlier version of the 
Code.11 The “big four” states, California, Florida, New York, and Texas, all 
continue to go their own way.12 What is more, even the sixteen adopters have 
seen fit to tinker with, or to omit, many of the Code’s provisions.13 Some of the 
Code’s less popular sections are scarcely in effect anywhere, turning up in only 
tiny handfuls of states.14 To teach such rules as law makes little sense, at least 
in a doctrinal course. The Uniform Trust Code has proven a more popular 
product, but even it is confined to half the states, among them only one of the 
“big four”—Florida—where local lawmakers tinkered to such an extent that 
they renamed their handiwork the Florida Trust Code.15 
Largely keyed in their third iterations to the Uniform Acts, the 
Restatements feature similar attributes. These products “purport to state an 
authoritative or recommended view of current American common law,”16 as 
well as statutes in some instances, “[a]s is increasingly true of Restatement 
 
 9. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 727, 732 
(2012). 
 10. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 364, 366 (amended 2010). 
 11. These are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Utah. Uniform Probate Code (UPC) Adoption By The States, supra note 3. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Massachusetts, the most recent state to adopt the Uniform Probate Code as an omnibus 
act in 2012, nevertheless left out several of the Code’s more controversial provisions: its 
disclaimer law and its harmless-error power, among others. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
190B, §§ 2-503, 2-801 (West 2012). The reporter has complained about local tinkering, but the 
practice continues. See John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of 
Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 878–79 (1992). 
 14. For example, the Uniform Probate Code’s modern antilapse provision appears in its 
original form in some five states, as tallied by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 statutory note 1 (1999). 
 15. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0101 (West 2013). 
 16. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust Law 
at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2000) (emphasis added) (writing as reporter for 
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
684 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:681 
work.”17 In progressive editions, the Restatements have grown more and more 
aspirational,18 sometimes even taking positions contrary to judicial doctrine 
that is accepted today by overwhelming numbers of courts.19 In the process, 
the Restatements’ authority has waned, and they are cited less and less 
frequently in the case law.20 Courts know better than to accept reflexively the 
third Restatements as distillations of existing law.21 In a few instances, the 
reporters’ zeal in pressing their innovations appears to have prompted 
misrepresentations that call for added caution. For example, in the course of 
endorsing the “harmless error” doctrine for wills, the reporter claims that the 
Restatement (Third) of Property is “aligned with [the] modern trend.”22 In 
truth, only six jurisdictions have adopted a full-blown version of the doctrine—
scarcely a trend.23 Moreover, some ideas propounded in the Restatements have 
no prospect of ever becoming law. For instance, the Restatement (Third) of 
Property offers up major revisions of the law of future interests.24 To my mind, 
these revisions would make a great deal of sense, yet they could never 
realistically dislodge the formulations that have remained entrenched in Anglo-
 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS foreword (2003). 
 18. For an exploration of the trend, see David A. Thomas, Restatements Relating to 
Property: Why Lawyers Don’t Really Care, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 655, 657–75 (2004). 
 19. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 2.7 cmt. a (“this section reverses the common-law rule”). 
 20. A search of the Westlaw database finds that the Restatement (Second) of Property: 
Donative Transfers, promulgated between 1983 and 1992, has been cited in a total of eighty-
seven state and federal cases. After sixteen years, this Restatement project began to be superseded 
by the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, promulgated 
between 1999 and 2010, and now operative (at least in part) for fourteen years. Thus far, the 
Restatement (Third) has been cited in a total of only fifty-five state and federal cases. Professor 
David Thomas found that the modern Restatements of property have proven far less influential, 
as measured by case citations, than the equivalent Restatements of tort and contract. See Thomas, 
supra note 18, at 656 & n.1. 
 21. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 902 (Ill. 2009) (“We have not yet had 
reason to consider whether any section of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts . . . is an accurate 
expression of Illinois law”). Restatements have been adopted as de facto common law, however, 
in two jurisdictions: the Virgin Islands and the Northern Mariana Islands. Kristen David Adams, 
The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 
425–46 (2004). 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. 
b. 
 23. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-503 (LexisNexis 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
700.2503 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 
2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-503 (West 1998). 
See also supra note 13 (remarking the failure of Massachusetts—the most recent state to adopt 
the Uniform Probate Code—to enact the doctrine). 
 24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS div. 
VII (2011). 
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American law for centuries on end.25 In this and other areas, the Restatements 
have become, in the words of one critic, “academic exercises . . . [with] little 
influence on the actual daily application and administration of the law,”26 very 
like portions of the Uniform Probate Code, and less the “handy resources for 
trust and estate lawyers”27 that they are supposed to be. The model laws can 
usefully be taught, but not as representative of current Wills and Trusts 
doctrine. 
Concentration on the model laws would make sense only in a pure policy 
course. Those laws may gain acceptance somehow, somewhere, sometime, but 
they are not the law of the present. To focus on them in a Wills and Trusts 
course today represents an indulgence that only professors at the most elite law 
schools could contemplate. 
This still leaves the possibility of teaching what Professor Melvin 
Eisenberg dubbed “national law,” to wit, “statements of and about law in 
general terms, divorced from particular jurisdictions.”28 Casebooks typically 
adopt this approach. It presents a challenge in the inheritance field, where 
national law remains about as decentralized as law can be. But casebooks and 
courses can still present majority rules as indicative of our national inheritance 
law. 
In my judgment, such an approach remains impoverished, in that it fails to 
communicate the richness of alternatives, the thousand flowers (mixed with a 
few poisonous weeds) that have blossomed in this heterogeneous region of the 
legal landscape. 
Which brings me to my own preferred, albeit idiosyncratic, approach to the 
jurisdictional problem. In my Wills and Trusts course, I strive to broaden my 
exploration of national law by elaborating—or, when appropriate, briefly 
outlining—the range of doctrinal options that exists among the states. Where 
the options are binary, or even ternary, I take the time to teach each one, even 
if one of them dominates the field: for instance, with regard to the problem of 
lapsed bequests, where the beneficiary named under a will predeceases the 
testator, I teach both the modern remain-in-the-residue rule and the traditional 
no-residue-upon-a-residue rule, even though the second of these hangs on by a 
 
 25. Nonetheless, hope springs eternal. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, What’s in the Third and 
Final Volume of the New Restatement of Property that Estate Planners Should Know About, 38 
ACTEC J. 23, 28–33, 42–45 (2012) [hereinafter Waggoner, Restatement]. Parts of this division of 
the Restatement are based upon a reform proposal propounded over forty years ago, to no avail, 
by the reporter. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal 
for Legislative Action, 85 HARV. L. REV. 729 passim (1972). 
 26. Thomas, supra note 18, at 695. 
 27. Waggoner, Restatement, supra note 25, at 45. 
 28. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Concept of National Law and the Rule of Recognition, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1229, 1230, 1232 (2002). 
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thread today, in only eight jurisdictions.29 I do so not because the no-residue-
upon-a-residue rule is doctrinally important in American law. Plainly, it no 
longer is. Its significance rather is didactic. By teaching both majority and 
minority rules, one can elucidate to students that the majority rule, even if it 
reigns supreme, is not written in stone—and one can do so in a concrete way 
(so to say), by demonstrating that alternatives do exist, however seldom seen. 
In other words, by identifying alternative rules, the professor lays the predicate 
for a policy discussion, giving students the opportunity to compare actual, 
alternative rules, to contemplate their relative virtues and vices, and perhaps 
even to think creatively about other alternatives not yet adopted or 
contemplated by lawmakers anywhere. 
Of course, in those regions of the law of Wills and Trusts (not few in 
number) where an even greater wealth of doctrinal alternatives exists, this 
approach becomes too time-consuming to pursue comprehensively. 
Identification of such pluralisms is itself significant, but here the only realistic 
choice open to the professor is between generalization and teaching local law. 
One can, for example, point out that some states augment the intestacy rights 
of whole-blooded relatives over half-blooded relatives, without delving into all 
of the myriad ways that different states do so. Again, this recognition can 
suffice as an entryway to a policy discussion of whether half-blooded relatives 
should be amalgamated with or distinguished from whole-blooded relatives in 
an intestacy scheme, again rendering the legal dichotomy concrete, but in a 
more generalized way. 
Finally, and perhaps a trifle pedantically, I strive to add a statistical 
component to my presentation by indicating the actual or approximate number 
of states that take one or another approach to each topic within the field of 
Wills and Trusts. That is difficult to do as concerns areas that continue to be 
governed by judicial doctrine but relatively easy to do with respect to rules that 
have been codified. Many sections of the Restatement (Third) of Property 
include “statutory notes” tallying local variations, sometimes with minor 
inaccuracies and in need of updating,30 but helpful for present purpose; and, of 
course, Westlaw’s statutory data-base represents another invaluable source of 
information on this score. Obviously, the point of this exercise is not for 
students to learn how many states have adopted each alternative, let alone what 
states have adopted which ones, but simply to give students a rough idea of 
which alternatives predominate, and the extent to which they do so. 
Testing also requires clarification in connection with this approach. It 
seems inappropriate to test students on a singular national law when one has 
enriched it with a discussion of alternatives. My solution is to ask students to 
 
 29. For a summary of the history, see Adam J. Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
1423, 1468–69 (2013). 
 30. See, e.g., id. at 1460 n.185. 
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prepare themselves to do either of two things: either to apply a specific rule set 
out in a statutory excerpt included in the hypothetical problem that I compose, 
operative only for purposes of that problem, or, in the absence of such a 
statutory excerpt, to work out the solution under the principal alternative rules, 
assuming no single rule prevails. But I also emphasize that I will call upon 
students to apply alternative rules only in those areas where no more than two 
alternatives exist—otherwise, the exercise becomes too complicated. 
Finally, let me add that the academic tension between the general and the 
particular in this field is not inescapable. Given sufficient time, one can take 
both approaches simultaneously. At least when teaching at a regional law 
school, I end the discussion of national doctrine and policy with respect to each 
and every topic that I cover by indicating, for the students’ edification and not 
for purposes of the final examination, which option lawmakers in “our” state 
have adopted. That way, those students who do wind up practicing in-state 
have a body of doctrinal information at their disposal to which they can always 
refer back, for purposes of bar review or beyond, without regionalizing the 
course in the bargain. 
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